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Abstract
The dual income tax provides the self-employed entrepreneur with huge
incentives to participate in tax minimizing income shifting to have more of his
income taxed as capital income. The Norwegian split model is designed to re-
move these incentives, but it contains loopholes. The present paper concludes
that the split model induces the self-employed entrepreneur to over-invest in
firm real capital. In addition, the corporate organizational form serves as a tax
shelter for high income entrepreneurs. The higher his income and the higher
the diﬀerence between the marginal tax rates on labor and capital, the larger
the incentives to incorporate.
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1 Introduction.
In line with the trend in the OECD-area, the Nordic countries carried out base
broadening and rate cutting tax reforms in the early nineties. By introducing the
dual income tax1 they went even further and in a diﬀerent direction than previous
reforms in other countries. The dual income tax separates capital income from labor
income. In contrast to the global income tax, which levies one tax schedule on the
sum of income from all sources, the dual income tax combines a low proportional
tax on capital income with a progressive tax on other income, mostly labor income.
Later Belgium, France, Italy, and Japan also introduced versions of the dual income
tax and have separate tax schedules for labor income and interest income2. This
constitutes a huge natural experiment which needs to be studied more closely to
draw lessons for future tax reforms.
The diﬀerential treatment of capital income and labor income under the dual
income tax has several justifications3. First, the globalization of capital markets
limits the scope of national taxation of mobile capital. Typically, labor is much less
mobile than capital and may be taxed at a higher rate without risking an erosion of
the tax base. Second, labor income constitutes the basis for future old age retirement
benefits, as well as present health care privileges. Third, capital enters into taxable
wealth. The eﬃcient tax rate on capital income should hence be viewed in connection
with the wealth tax rate. Fourth, a lower tax on capital income stimulates personal
saving. Fifth, in the presence of inflation, a low tax on capital income compensates
for the fact that the tax is levied on the nominal, and not the real return to capital. In
addition to this, the justification for keeping the tax on capital income proportional
is that a progressive tax on capital income would be highly exposed to avoidance.
One weakness of the dual income tax is the distributional implications of the
taxation of entrepreneurs and small businesses. Income from self-employment and
small businesses stems partially from return to the labor eﬀort put in by the active
owner, and partially from the return to capital invested in the firm. For medium and
high income classes, there is a large diﬀerence in the marginal tax rates on capital
1The dual income tax was introduced in Sweden 1991, Norway 1992, and Finland 1993. The
idea originated in Denmark, and was implemented in their 1985 tax reform. Later they introduced
a hybrid system, mostly due to redistributive concerns.
2See Fuest and Weichenrieder (2002).
3See Sørensen (1998) and (2001).
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and labor income4, providing large incentives for income shifting from labor income
to capital income in order to minimize tax payments. Owners of small businesses can
easily do this by reducing their own wage payments and increase dividend payments,
in order to maximize net income. In the extreme case, all individuals would start own
businesses in order to participate in this tax arbitrage, which would totally erode the
tax base. To prevent this, the dual income tax countries have implemented diﬀerent
versions of a ”split” system of dual income taxation for self-employed entrepreneurs
and corporations owned by the employees. Under this split system, one part of
firm profits is taxed as capital income and the remaining profits are taxed as labor
income.
The Norwegian split model of dual income taxation was introduced at the end of
a depression, and a period of strong economic expansion followed. In the years after
the tax reform, the number of self-employed individuals decreased, while the number
of corporations increased. Does this mean that the split model discourages entrepre-
neurship, or does it mean that the activity of the entrepreneurs is unchanged, while
their preferred organizational form has changed5? Also, the share of corporations
taxed under the split model decreased from 52% in 1992, to 32% in 2000. Which
factors make this type of behavior rational? The present paper studies the tax in-
duced distortions in a small firm’s investment decision and choice of organizational
form in a theoretical model, and three questions are asked. First, which are the in-
centives to invest in real capital in the firm for a self-employed entrepreneur under
the split model? Second, which are the incentives to invest in real capital in the firm
for an incorporated entrepreneur not liable to the split model? And third, which are
the entrepreneur’s determinants for switching organizational from self-employed to
corporation?
The tax code’s eﬀect on the firm’s choice between debt and equity, as well as
the choice of whether to retain or distribute earnings are thoroughly discussed in
the literature6. Lindhe et al. (2002) analyze the eﬀects of the Swedish, Finnish and
Norwegian split models on the cost of capital in closely held corporations.
4At the present, the diﬀerence in the top marginal tax rates on labor income and capital income
is 37.3 percentage points in Norway, including social security contributions.
5Slemrod (2001) states that in many cases, what appears to be real eﬀects of tax changes are in
fact only the result of creative re-labelling activity by the individuals, and this needs to be carefully
considered when evaluating the eﬀects of a tax reform.
6See for instance Gentry, 1994
3
Diﬀerent levels of corporate and personal tax rates provide private investors with
incentives to use corporations as a tax shelter to save their capital income from high
personal tax rates, a point highlighted by Fuest and Weichenrieder (2002).
The combination of low corporate tax rate and high personal income tax rate pro-
vides managers with incentives to relabel labor income as capital income, eﬀectively
reducing their tax on salaries, an eﬀect identified empirically on Norwegian micro
data by Fjærli and Lund (2001)7. But this income shifting may not be optimal if the
individual has a long term horizon. By receiving wages, he pays higher taxes, but he
also becomes entitled to future pension payments from the public sector. Dividends
do not entitle him to future pension. If the individual cares about his retirement, it
might be optimal to pay more wages than the short-term tax minimization predicts,
and Fjærli and Lund also document the presence of this eﬀect.
There is an endogeneity of a firm’s tax system: by changing organizational form
the firm can experience a shift in the taxes it faces. Gravelle and Kotlikoﬀ (1989,
1993) started a new strand of the literature on the firm’s choice of organizational
form following a tax reform altering the relative tax rates on personal and cor-
porate income. If corporate tax rates increase relative to personal tax rates, this
reduces the firm’s incentives to incorporate, and vice versa. Empirical support for
this is presented by Goolsbee (1998), Gordon and MacKie-Mason (1990, 1994), and
MacKie-Mason and Gordon (1997).
Non-tax factors also play an important role in the firm’s choice of organizational
form, as Ayers et al (1996) thoroughly discuss. Business risk and default risk are
factors that work in favor of the corporate organizational form. The self-employed
individual carries all risk himself and is personal responsible for all claims. He may in
case of a bankruptcy be liable to pay damages beyond the capital he has invested in
the firm. In a corporation, the individual share holder has limited liability and may in
case of a bankruptcy loose at most the capital he has invested in the firm. The higher
the relative risk of the operation, the more likely the business will be organized as
a corporation. Another important factor is the opportunity to raise new capital. A
corporation may issue new shares and might more easily raise new capital than the
self-employed entrepreneur. Also, size does matter. As firms become large, owners
are more likely to hire professional managers and become less directly involved in
7This study utilizes rich micro data from 1991, a year prior to the full implementation of the
1992 tax reform. Hence the split model does not apply here.
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management decisions. Similarly, the higher the number of owners in a firm, the
higher the probability for conflict among them. Then conflicts may be minimized
when choosing the corporate form with a more formal ownership structure. The
self-employed entrepreneur has full control over the activity and strategy of his firm.
This might change if he organizes as a corporation with passive shareholders who
have strong opinions on how the firm should be run, and Andersen (1993) states that
if the entrepreneur very much appreciates his freedom and wants to lay all business
strategies himself, he should not incorporate.
The present paper concludes that the split model of dual income taxation pro-
vides the individual with large incentives to participating in tax minimizing income
shifting. It actually induces the self-employed individual to over-invest in less risky
firm real capital. Real capital investments is a device to shift income from labor
income to capital income and to enjoy the lower capital income tax rate on a larger
share of total income. In addition, the corporate organizational form serves as a tax
shelter for high income entrepreneurs. The higher his income, and the larger the
diﬀerence between the tax rates on labor income and capital income, the larger the
incentives to incorporate (with less than two thirds of the shares held by the active
owner) to escape the split model and reduce total tax payments. Only low-income
entrepreneurs have incentives to stay under the split model in order to enjoy the for-
warding of negative imputed return to labor, in order to deduct this against future
positive imputed return to labor. Empirical observations support the predictions of
the model.
Section 2 describes the Norwegian version of the split model of dual income tax-
ation in detail. Section 3 presents the model, and sections 4 and 5 analyze the eﬀect
of the split model on the self-employed and incorporated entrepreneur’s investment
portfolio. Section 6 compares the two organizational forms, and section 7 extends
the model to include inaccurate tax allowances for real capital depreciation. Section
8 presents empirical evidence and concludes.
2 The Norwegian split model.
The Norwegian tax reform of 1992 implemented the dual income tax in the purest
form of all the Nordic countries. When considering how to solve the problems of a
consistent tax treatment of small businesses, the split model of dual income taxation
5
was chosen, separating income from diﬀerent sources. Under the split model, an
imputed return to the capital invested in the firm is calculated by multiplying the
value of the capital assets8 by a fixed rate of return on capital9. The imputed return
to capital is taxed at the corporate rate, which equals the capital income tax rate at
the individual level. Business profits net of imputed capital return10 is the imputed
return to labor, which is taxed as labor income whether the wages are actually paid
to the owner or not. This reduces the possibility for the self-employed individual
to classify all income as capital income in order to reduce taxes. If imputed labor
income is negative, the loss does not oﬀset other income, but may be carried forward
to be deducted against future imputed labor income. Both self-employed individuals
and corporations where active11 owners possess two-thirds of the shares or more are
taxed under the split model.
By exaggerating the capital assets of the firm, the self-employed individual
achieves a reduction in the imputed labor income, and reduces his tax payments.
This may be done in several ways, for instance by shifting from leased to owned12
premises and machinery, by increasing stocks at the end of the year, by increasing
and extending customers’ trade receivables at the end of the year, and by financing
private durable goods in the firm. Acquired good-will is very hard for the tax au-
thorities to value, and overstating this and other parts of firm capital reduces the
imputed labor income. Also, by letting the firm invest in durable private consump-
tion goods such as boats, cars, cottages, etc. the owner increases his consumption
and reduces tax payments. Even if the increased wealth tax due on the value of
capital assets is taken into account this strategy is lucrative for the self-employed13.
8These assets include physical business capital, acquired good-will and other intangible assets,
business inventories, and credit extended to customers net of debt to the firm’s supplyers.
9This rate of return on capital is set anually by the Parliament on the basis of the average rate
of return on government bonds (5% in 2000) pluss a risk premium (5% in 2000).
10If the firm has employees in addition to the owner(s), a salary deduction of 12% of the wage
bill from taxable wage payments applies before the return to the owner’s labor eﬀort is imputed.
11An owner is characterised as active if he works more than 300 hours annually in the firm. Close
family members of active owners are not recognized as passive owners by the tax authorities.
12There is an oﬀsetting shift of ownership regarding former owners of leased assets. Presumably
there will be a clientele eﬀect where assets are owned by self-employed and companies subject to
the split model.
13Assume that the self-employed individual increases his investments by NOK 100. At the going
rate his imputed return to capital increases with NOK 10, which means that the imputed return to
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It can even be profitable to borrow in the financial market to invest in business
capital. Such debts are private and entitles to tax allowances.
But the largest loophole in the split system is probably at the margin, of whether
a firm is subject to the split model at all. By incorporating and selling more than
one-third of the shares to investors not active in the firm, firms can avoid being
taxed according to the split system. The corporation is then free to pay its active
owners as little wage and as much dividends as it likes. This technique is especially
attractive for individuals in ”liberal” professions, such as lawyers, medical doctors
and dentists. These are typically professions with little capital required to run a
business, and the imputed labor income is accordingly high. As a corporation they
may take out all the compensation for their own labor eﬀort as dividends.
3 The model.
For simplicity, the following analysis abstracts from many of the details discussed
above. Consider an utility maximizing entrepreneurial individual who lives for two
periods and who is about to start a business. He needs to decide how much to
invest in the firm, and which organizational form to choose. As an entrepreneur, he
is taxed under the split model. A corporation oﬀers the possibility to reduce tax
payments by reducing his wage and increasing dividends, since he no longer is taxed
according to the split model. Diﬀerent entrepreneurs have diﬀerent preferences, and
some have clear preferences for which organizational form they prefer. Here consider
the marginal entrepreneur who initially has no intrinsic value of either of the two
organizational forms.
The individual has a given time endowment in both periods, which he spends
working in his firm and enjoying leisure. In order to study the individual’s investment
decision and the choice of organizational form separately from his labor supply
decision, assume that total time spent working in his firm is given. The remaining
labor income is reduced by the same amount. Assuming that he is in the top wage income bracket,
this increased investment reduces his personal taxes by NOK 5.2. The increased return to capital
is subject to taxation on firm level at 28 per cent. In addition he is subject to a wealth tax of 1.1
per cent on total wealth. His taxes on firm level hence increases with NOK 3.9. Even when the
increased wealth tax is taken into consideration, it still pays oﬀ to engage in this kind of income
shifting.
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leisure time is hence also given. A change of organizational form in order to reduce
tax payments is only a re-labelling of the existing nature of the self-employed’s
activity, and he puts in the same amount of labor in the two cases. But the change
of organizational form could nevertheless change the return to working, since it
aﬀects the net return to entrepreneurial activity in the presence of taxes.
Utility and separability. Let the individual’s utility function be represented by
U = u(C1, C2), (1)
which has positive and non-increasing marginal utilities of both first and second
period consumption. The individual chooses the investment portfolio and organiza-
tional form that maximize his lifetime utility. The Fisher separability property of this
model ensures that the investment decision is independent of the utility function,
as is the choice of organizational form. He chooses the alternatives that generate
the highest net present value of income. No intrinsic values of the diﬀerent organi-
zational forms are present, and the individual maximizes the net present value of
his income such as to maximize his consumption. Hence the utility maximization
problem reduces to an income maximization problem.
Investments and income. In the first period he has a given income Y , which he
allocates to investing in real capital K in his new firm, and saving B in the financial
market, in order to maximize his lifetime income. Investments in the financial market
yield the exogenously given real rate of return, r. Savings may be negative, and then
the individual borrows in the financial market. Loans are repaid in full in the second
period.
Investments in firm real capital yield the return R(K), which is the return to the
individual’s entrepreneurial investment and depends positively on the sales value of
firm production and negatively on the depreciation rate, δ, of firm real capital.
The exact expression forR(K) varies according to the chosen organizational form
and will hence be specified separately in the two following sections along with the
diﬀerent expressions for the individual’s lifetime budget constraint.
The individual’s first period income, Y1, is given by:
Y1 = Y −K −B. (2)
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Second period income, Y2, is given by:
Y2 = R(K) +K + [1 + r] ·B − T, (3)
where T is total tax payments, which depends on the chosen organizational form.
The net of depreciation real capital is liquidized in the second period to finance his
consumption.
Production. Our individual is the only person employed by the firm, and thus
labor as a production factor in the firm is fixed. The firm produces one type of
product, which is sold in the second period at a given price14 set to unity, p = 1
The production level X varies according to the amount of capital, K, invested in
the firm, and it is given by the production function
X = F (K), (4)
which has a positive and decreasing marginal product of capital.
Taxes. Let tw be the proportional tax rate on labor income and tk the proportional
tax rate on capital income. We simplify by assuming that the tax on labor income is
proportional, when it in fact is progressive in most countries, including the countries
with a dual income tax. But one might think of this tax as the top marginal tax rate
on labor income. The progressive labor income tax schedule is then in fact ”flat on
the top”. Assume that the tax rate on labor income is higher than that on capital
income, tw > tk.
An additional pay-roll tax, tp, applies on all wage payments made by the corpo-
ration15, and this tax is paid on firm level. Hence the shareholders carry this cost
according to the amount of shares they hold.
Let α be the share of actual depreciation which is tax deductible16. If α > 1,
then the tax code allows for generous deductions for real capital depreciation, and
if α < 1, less than the actual depreciation is tax deductible. In the first parts of the
following analysis, let α = 1.
No wealth tax is present in the model.
14The market demand for this good is nevertheless not given.
15In 2001, the ordinary pay-roll tax was 14,1% on all wage payments made to employees. It is
pure revenue generating and does not entitle the individual to additional benefits.
16This follows the modelling approach of Sandmo (1989).
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Risk. The more the individual invests in firm real capital, the less diversified is
his investment portfolio, and the higher is his potential loss in case of bankruptcy.
Bonds are risk free, and yield a safe annual return.
Under the split model of dual income taxation there is an implicit compensation
for the riskiness of investing in the own firm, which will be discussed thoroughly
in the next section. Besides this tax allowance for risk under the split model, risk
does not exist as a motive for changing organizational form, since the present paper
analyzes the tax induced change of organizational form. Both the self-employed
and the incorporated entrepreneurs are risk neutral. The self-employed entrepreneur
carries all risk of the operation himself, while the incorporated entrepreneur shares
the risk with his fellow shareholders.
4 The self-employed entrepreneur.
Let the subscript ”s” denote the previously described variables when the entre-
preneur is self-employed. The self-employed individual owns the firm and has full
disposal over total sales income, F (Ks). The real capital depreciation, δ, is a cost of
production. Then the return to entrepreneurial investment, R(K), can be expressed
as
R(Ks) = F (Ks)− δ ·Ks. (5)
The imputation rate and risk valuation. A self-employed entrepreneur has
full disposal over firm income, and would, if he could and ceterus paribus, have all
income taxed as capital income. The tax authorities assign a part of the income
as a return to the capital invested, and the residual as a return to labor, which is
taxed as labor income. When assigning the part of the income to be taxed at the
capital income tax rate, a return to real capital in the firm is imputed at a fixed
rate ri of the total value of the firm real capital at the beginning of the period17.
The subscript ”i” refers to ”imputed”.
17When the split model was first introduced, the self-employed individual could choose whether
the value at the beginning or at the end of the period should be used in the imputation of the
return to firm capital. Later this changed, and at the present, the average of the values of firm
capital at the beginning and at the end of the period should be used to impute the return to firm
capital. The first specification is chosen for this paper.
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The imputation rate is set by the parliament, and it is the sum of the average
return to government bonds, r, and a risk compensation factor. This risk compen-
sation factor acknowledges the fact that the entrepreneur takes a risk by investing
in real capital in the firm and hence looses the possibility to risk diversification in
the financial market. The individual has his own assessment of this risk and the
additional risk premium he requires to be willing to invest in risky firm real capital.
Let µ be the diﬀerence between the risk premium oﬀered by the tax authorities and
the risk premium demanded by the entrepreneur. The imputation rate is defined as
ri = r + µ. (6)
The government’s risk compensation is the same for all type of firms and all types of
real capital. Hence less risky projects or sectors tend to have an over-compensation
of the actual risk, µ > 0, as more risky projects or sectors are under-compensated
for their actual risk, µ < 0. The investment distortions created by this will be
thoroughly discussed in the following sections.
Tax payments and the individual’s budget constraint Total taxes due for
the self-employed are given by
Ts = tk · ri ·Ks + tw · {F (Ks)− [δ + ri] ·Ks}+ tk · r ·Bs. (7)
Capital income tax is paid on the imputed return to invested capital, ri · Ks. La-
bor income tax is paid on the imputed return to labor, which is the value of the
production net of production costs (which here is the tax recognized real capital de-
preciation18) and the imputed return to invested capital19, {F (Ks)− [δ + ri] ·Ks}.
In addition, capital income tax is paid on interest income from the investments
in bonds. Combining the equations (3), (5) and (7), the self-employed individual’s
private net disposable second period income, Y2,s:
Y2,s = [1− tw] · [F (Ks)− δ ·Ks] + {1 + [tw − tk] · ri} ·Ks (8)
+ [1 + (1− tk) · r] ·Bs
18Here α = 1.
19If the imputed labor income exceeds a given threshold, which in 1993 was NOK 1,25 Million,
the remainder is taxed as capital income. Assume in this analysis that the imputed labor income
always is below this threshold.
11
The first part of the right hand side of (8) represents the individual’s net of taxes
income from his firm if all income were taxed as labor income. But a part ri · Ks
of the income is actually taxed as capital income, which increases his net income
by a fraction [tw − tk] of total imputed return to firm real capital. The larger the
diﬀerence between the marginal tax rates on labor income and capital income, the
higher is the individual’s net disposable income.
The net present value of the individual’s lifetime income as a self-employed en-
trepreneur, Ys, is found by combining the equations (8) and (2):
Ys = Y1 +
[1− tw] · [F (Ks)− δ ·Ks] + {[tw − tk] · ri − (1− tk) · r} ·Ks
1 + (1− tk) · r (9)
The individual chooses the investment level that maximizes his lifetime income.
4.1 The self-employed’s investments in the absence of taxes.
In optimum, the value of the marginal product of capital, FKs , equals the user cost
of capital:
FKs = δ + r. (10)
The individual invests capital in the firm until the value of the production from
this additional investment equals the cost of the investment, namely the sum of real
capital depreciation and the return to the financial investments, the real interest
rate. Since the marginal product of capital is decreasing in the amount of capital,
if either or both of the depreciation rate and the real interest rate increases, the
amount of real capital invested in the firm decreases because of the increased costs.
4.2 The self-employed’s investments under the split model.
Under the split model of dual income taxation, where ri = r + µ, the self-employed
individual’s optimal investment condition reduces to
FKs = r + δ −
tw − tk
1− tw
· µ (11)
Observe that the optimal investment condition reduces to the Fisher-condition (10)
if taxes are comprehensive, tw = tk. The return to all investment alternatives are
taxed at the same rate, and this eliminates the incentive to shift income from labor
income to capital income as a re-labelling eﬀort to reduce tax payments. Any tax
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induced distortion to the individual’s investment decision is hence eliminated. So, a
comprehensive and proportional income tax is a neutral tax on the return to capi-
tal, and it introduces no distortions in the investment decision of the self-employed
entrepreneur.
We have in this paper, though, assumed that tw > tk, which means that the last
fraction of (11) depends critically on the net risk compensation rate µ.
When µ > 0, the entrepreneur is over-compensated for the risk of investing
in real capital in his firm, and the presence of taxes introduce distortions in the
investment market. This over-compensation represents an additional return to real
capital investments compared with bonds, and the individual invests in real capital
at a lower marginal return than he would have done in the absence of taxes. Hence
the split model induces the individual to over-invest in real capital.
The entrepreneur is on the other hand under-compensated for the risk of investing
in real capital in the firm when µ < 0. Hence the split model induces the entrepreneur
in a risky sector to under-invest in real capital in the firm.
How large these tax-induced distortions are depend on the sizes of the tax rates
and the diﬀerence between them, as well as on the size of the imputation rate to
labor eﬀort.
If the tax authorities’ risk compensation rate equals the demanded risk com-
pensation by the entrepreneur, µ = 0, the split model creates no distortions in the
investment portfolio of the entrepreneur.
The eﬀect of tax changes on the investment behavior. How is the individ-
ual’s investment decision aﬀected by tax on capital income and on labor income?
Comparative static analysis of the optimal investment condition (11) reveals the
following:
i) Labor income tax:
∂Ks
∂tw
= − µ · [1− tk]
FKs,Ks · [1− tw]2
. (12)
The change in the marginal product of capital by increased investments in real
capital in the firm, FKs,Ks, is negative. Thus the eﬀect of an increased labor income
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tax rate on the self-employed entrepreneur’s investment behavior depends critically
on his valuation of the riskiness of the firm.
If he estimates the risk to be moderate, µ > 0, then the higher the tax rate on
labor income is, the more the self-employed individual invests in firm real capital.
This is the tax arbitrage eﬀect. Real capital is a more attractive income shifting
device the larger the diﬀerence between the two tax rates is. And the more real
capital invested in the firm, the higher is the imputed return to firm real capital,
and the lower is the imputed return to labor eﬀort, which is to be taxed at the higher
labor income tax rate20.
If the firm is highly exposed to risk, µ < 0, an increase in the tax rate on labor
income induces the self-employed individual to invest less in firm real capital and
more in risk free bonds. The increased tax on labor income reduces the individual’s
total return to entrepreneurial activity, but he does not want to invest more in real
capital in his firm, since he is under-compensated for the risk he is exposed to.
ii) Capital income tax:
∂Ks
∂tk
=
µ
FKs,Ks · [1− tw]
(13)
Increased tax on capital income reduces the tax arbitrage gain of shifting income
from labor income to capital income through increased investments in moderately
risky firm real capital, µ > 0. Hence the self-employed’s investment in firm real
capital is reduced as the tax on capital income is increased. On the other hand, the
above result states formally that the lower the tax rate on capital income is, the
more the individual invests in firm real capital and the less he invests in bonds. This
is due to the increased return to income shifting when tax rate on capital is reduced.
But if the risk of the operation is higher than the government compensates for,
µ < 0, the value of this under-compensation, [tw − tk] · ri · Ks, decreases, and the
individual invests more in firm real capital as the capital income tax rate increases.
20But the total eﬀect depends on other factors as well. The higher the capital income tax rate,
the smaller the diﬀerence between the two tax rates, and the smaller the reduction in tax payments
stemming from this tax arbitrage activity. Also, the more convex the production technology, the
less is the production increase from an increase in firm capital, and the less does the individual
invests in additional firm capital.
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All real capital is owned by the firm in this model, and in order to benefit from the
possibility to reduce tax payments trough increased investments, the entrepreneur
must increase the total level of real capital in the firm. On the other hand, if parts
of the real capital were leased, the entrepreneur could purchase this real capital
and still have the same level of expenses, just switching from having to pay lease
to pay interest on a loan. This manoeuvre would leave the level of firm real capital
unchanged, and it would reduce the entrepreneurs tax payments. Either way the
split model contains great incentives for the self-employed entrepreneur to change
his investment behavior.
A digression on the wealth tax. A wealth tax would reduce the incentives to
overstate the value of firm real capital. No wealth tax is present in this model, and
in this framework the presence of a wealth tax would not alter the split-model’s
distortions to the investment portfolio of the entrepreneur. Increased investments
in real capital means reduced investments in financial capital and does not increase
the wealth tax liability.
The indirect income function. Let fKs be the investment level in firm real capi-
tal that maximizes the individual’s net lifetime income. By choosing this investment
level the entrepreneur maximizes the present value of his lifetime after tax income
and receives the income eYs, which is the highest achievable income level for the indi-
vidual if he organizes as a self-employed at the given tax rates. This maximum value
function is the indirect income function, and it is found by applying the investment
level fKs in the individual’s lifetime income function, the right hand side of equation
(9). Rearranging this, the indirect income function is given by:
eYs = Y + [1− tw] · F (fKs) + {[tw − tk] · µ− [1− tw] · [r + δ]} · fKs
1 + (1− tk) · r (14)
The indirect income function will come in handy in the later analysis of the organi-
zational choice.
5 The incorporated entrepreneur.
In the following, use the same variables as previously described in the paper, with
the subscript ”l” denoting a corporation with limited liability. The production tech-
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nology is independent of organizational form, and the same production function as
in the self-employed case applies.
If he incorporates, the individual receives some revenue from selling shares in his
firm to external investors. Model this as a reduction in the amount of real capital
investment required by the individual. The entrepreneurial individual invests a share
β ≥ 1 of total capital, and passive21 owners invest a share [1− β] . The present paper
concentrates on analyzing an entrepreneur’s choice of organizational form, given that
he undertakes the same activity. The choice of whether to be an entrepreneur or a
worker employed by others is not considered, and hence it is assumed that the
individual always wishes to have some ownership in his firm, that 0 < β.
The individual’s first period budget constraint (2) thus changes in the corporate
case:
Y1,l = Y − β ·Kl −Bl. (15)
At the same level of real capital in the firm under the two organizational forms, the
individual may invest more in the financial market if he organizes as a corporation
and has passive shareholders, that is if β < 1. The incorporated entrepreneur hence
has a greater possibility to diversify his investments at a given level of real capital
in the firm.
Dividends and wage payments. Shareholders receive dividend payments as a
return to their invested capital in the firm. The owners of the corporation, repre-
sented by the shareholder majority, decide the wage level of the active owner. All
firm profits are paid as dividends to the shareholders in the second period. Usually
capital costs and labor costs are deducted from sales income to find firm profits
available for dividend payments. This is a special case, though. The only reason for
the entrepreneurial individual to incorporate is to be able to pay the return to his
entrepreneurial activity as any given combination of wages and dividends. Hence
only real capital depreciation is deducted before the remainder of the sales income
is either paid as wages to the active owner or distributed as dividends to all owners.
Dividends are paid as a proportional return rate Ω ≤ rd ≤ 1 of corporate sales
income, F (Kl), of which the individual receives the share β. The lower boundary
Ω is defined later in this section. Wage payments are the remaining of the profits,
21In this model all share holders are passive, except for the entrepreneur.
16
and are given as [1− rd] ·F (Kl). The real capital depreciation is also carried by the
shareholders, and the entrepreneurial individual carries his share β of the deprecia-
tion δ ·Kl. Passive owners invest [1− β] ·Kl and receive [1− β] · [rd · F (Kl)− δ ·Kl] .
The individual’s return to his entrepreneurial investment is thus
R(Kl) = [1− rd] · F (Kl) + β · rd · F (Kl)− β · δ ·Kl. (16)
Tax payments and the individual’s budget constraint. If the individual
chooses to organize as a corporation, the size of his ownership determines which
regime the corporation is taxed under. If the active owner holds more than two
thirds of the shares, β > 2/3, the corporation is taxed under the split model, and
then rd = ri. If the active owner holds less than two thirds of the shares, β < 2/3,
with the rest of the shares held by passive owners, the corporation is taxed according
to corporate tax rules.
Private disposable income of the entrepreneur is given by net wage receipts,
net return to financial investments and his share of dividend payments, net of de-
preciation. Since the individual only invests a share of total firm capital, he may
invest more in the financial market. Total tax payments for the individual when he
organizes as a corporation are given by Tl:
Tl = [tw + β · tp] · [1− rd] · F (Kl) + tk · r ·Bl + tk · β · [rd · F (Kl)− δ ·Kl] (17)
Labor income tax is paid on total wage receipts by the individual, [1− rd] · F (Kl).
The pay-roll tax is levied on firm level on all wage payments, and the individual
indirectly carries a part β of this tax, since firm profits are reduced by this tax
and thus also what is available for dividend payments. The remainder is carried by
the passive shareholders. Capital income tax is paid on total interest income from
investments in the financial market, r·Bl. In addition, the firm pays corporate income
tax on total firm profit, which is sales income net of labor costs and depreciation.
Here corporate taxes are paid on dividend payments net of real capital depreciation,
[rd · F (Kl)− δ ·Kl] , since all profits are paid as dividends. Corporate taxes are paid
on firm level, and the individual carries a share β of these costs, since his dividend
receipts are reduced by the same amount. In principle, dividends are subject to
capital income taxation. But the individual receives a tax credit for taxes paid at
corporate level. The corporate income tax rate and the capital income tax rate on
individual level are identical, and hence his tax payments due on dividend receipts
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and his tax credit from taxes paid on corporate level cancel out. The incorporated
net present value of total lifetime income, Yl, is given by.
Yl = Y +
(
[1− tw − β · tp] · [1− rd] · F (Kl)
+ [1− tk] · β · {rd · F (Kl)− [δ + r] ·Kl}
)
1 + [1− tk] · r (18)
If β = 1, the active owner is the sole share holder of the corporation, and (18)
reduces to the the budget constraint of the self-employed.
The individual maximizes his lifetime income (18), and the optimal investment
condition is found from the first order condition with respect to real capital. Below it
is discussed how the presence of taxes aﬀects the corporation’s investment decision
and dividend payments, as well as the individual’s optimal ownership share.
5.1 Corporation in the absence of taxes.
It can be shown22 that in absence of taxes, β = 1 is the only possible solution, and
hence the entrepreneur holds all the shares. As long as the entrepreneur is the sole
owner and the only person working in the firm, it does not matter whether he pays
the firm profits as wages to himself or as dividends, and all values of the dividend
rate rd maximize his income. The optimal investment condition reduces to
FKl = r + δ, (19)
which is identical to the Fisher condition (10) developed in the self-employed case.
The individual’s investment portfolio is in the absence of taxes unaﬀected by the
choice of organizational form.
5.2 Corporation in the presence of taxes.
The optimal investment condition in the presence of taxes reduces to:
FKl = β ·
[1− tk] · [δ + r]
[1− tw − β · tp] · [1− rd] + [1− tk] · β · rd (20)
This depends crucially on the dividend payment rate and the entrepreneur’s owner-
ship rate in the firm, so let us now study these in detail.
22The deduction of this result is shown in the appendix, which is available from the author upon
request.
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The income function is linear in β and rd, and the maximum values of these
variables hence are at the boundaries, as in the case without taxes. Now 0 < β ≤
2/3, and thus β = 2/3 is the optimal value of the entrepreneur’s ownership in the
corporation, which means that the firm is not taxed according to the split model.
How much wages to pay the employee and what to pay in dividends is decided by
the majority of the shareholders, which in this case means the entrepreneur himself.
He chooses the combination of dividend payments and wage payments such as to
maximize his own disposable after-tax income, given that the passive shareholders
receive at least the same net return on their invested capital as in the financial
market. This lower boundary of rd is given by Ωt. Since all wage payments are subject
to the pay-roll tax on firm level, this cost reduces the total amount to be distributed
as wages and dividends, and the passive shareholders are to be compensated for this
as well. In this case Ωt is given by23:
Ωt =
r · [1− tk] · KlF (Kl) + tp
1− tk + tp
(21)
The value of this lower boundary on the dividend payment rate depends negatively
on the tax rate on capital income, since this reduces the net return to the alternative
investment as well, and positively on the pay-roll tax rate, since this reduces the
profit of the firm. A low productive firm needs to pay a higher share of their prof-
its as dividends to keep their shareholders satisfied than a highly productive firm.
Productivity is here measured as sales income per unit of firm real capital. Ωt = 1
if F (Kl)
Kl
= r, and Ωt < 1 if
F (Kl)
Kl
> r.
If the active owner in the corporation reduces his net wage receipts by one unit,
how much can he then increase his dividend receipts by? By reducing the active
owner’s net wage receipts by one unit, wage payments made by the firm is reduced
by 1
1−tw . The corporation pays pay-roll tax on all wage payments to the active owner,
and hence total labor costs for the firm is reduced by 1+tp
1−tw . Firm profit increases
by this amount and is taxed at the corporate tax rate, which is the same as the
tax rate on capital income on private level. The firm pays all additional net profits
as dividends to the shareholders, of which the active owner receives 2/3. This kind
of income shifting then yields the increased income Il per unit reduced net wage
23See mathematical appendix for the development of the equation.
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receipts by the active owner:
Il =
2
3
· [1− tk] · [1 + tp]
1− tw
− 1. (22)
This income shifting is more profitable for the individual the more of the corporation
he owns and the higher the pay-roll tax and the tax rate on labor income are. A
high tax rate on capital / corporate income reduces the incentives to participate in
this kind of income shifting24.
The only reason for the entrepreneur to incorporate is to escape the split model
and increase is private after-tax income, and he does so through reducing the part
of income taxed as labor income and increasing the part of income taxed as capital
income. This is only desirable if the tax rate on labor income is higher than the
tax rate on capital income, tw > tk, and if the gain in saved tax payments at least
compensates for the dividend payments to be made to the external investors, Il > 0.
The last condition puts specific restrictions for under which tax rates it is profitable
to engage in this kind of income shifting, namely only if
tw >
1
3
+
2
3
· [tk − (1− tk) · tp] . (23)
As the income function is linear in the dividend rate, rd, as well as in the ownership
share, two possibilities for a maxima exist: 1) : β = 2/3 and rd = Ωt, and 2) :
β = 2/3 and rd = 1. As long as the tax schedule satisfies condition (23) the
entrepreneur increases his private disposable income if he reduces his wages by one
unit and instead pays it as dividends. This he will continue doing until no wages are
paid and he receives the full compensation for his labor eﬀort as dividend payments,
rd = 1. If condition (23) does not hold, all incentives to incorporate and escape
the split model disappears. The model has only one optimal combination of the
individuals ownership share and dividend rate, namely alternative 2), where β = 2/3
and rd = 1. Applying these values reduces the optimal investment condition to
FKl = r + δ. (24)
The tax system does not impose any distortions in the corporation’s investment de-
cision. The tax rate on the return to real capital in the firm is the same as the tax
24At the present tax rates, tw = 0.55, tk = 0.28, and tp = 0.141, the individual’s gain from
income shifting is at the maximum 21.7%, given that he holds two thirds of the shares in the
corporation. This kind of income shifting is hence very profitable for the individual. By reducing
his net wage payments by one unit, he receives an additional 1.217 units of dividends.
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rate on the return to financial investments, and the corporation acquires the same
amount of real capital as in the absence of taxes.
Labor income taxation has no direct eﬀect on the level of real capital in the
corporation, since no wages are paid to the employee. But it does nevertheless aﬀect
the private gain from income shifting, Il, and it also aﬀects at which rates for the
capital income tax and the pay-roll tax it is profitable to engage in such an income
shifting
The indirect income function. The indirect income function (25) is found by
inserting the optimal investment level fKl along with the optimal values β = 2/3 and
rd = 1 from the individual’s income maximization problem into the income function.
Then eYl states the individual’s highest achievable income level when he organizes as
a corporation not subject to the split model:
eYl = Y + 2
3
· [1− tk] · F (
fKl)− [δ + r] ·fKl
1 + [1− tk] · r (25)
This will be used in the later analysis.
6 When to shift organizational form?
The direct costs of organizing as a corporation are moderate, and the process is also
not that complicated. But it is important to bear in mind that corporations are
subject to stricter regulations than self-employed. For instance, they are obliged to
have an accountant. Let all the costs of shifting organizational form by assumption be
represented by the parameter θ > 0, regardless of size. The individual incorporates
if the highest achievable net personal income is higher as a corporation than as
self-employed, and the diﬀerence at least covers the costs of incorporating. This
condition reduces to:
Incorporate if eYl − eYs > θ, (26)
and organize as a self-employed firm taxed according to the split model otherwise.
The larger this diﬀerence is, the higher are the incentives for the self-employed
entrepreneur to incorporate in order to reduce total tax payments. Now let us study
how the tax rates on labor income and capital income aﬀects the incentives to
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incorporated. The diﬀerence in income potential between the two organizational
forms is given by
eYl − eYs =



2
3
· [1− tk] ·
n
F (fKl)− [r + δ] ·fKlo
− [1− tw] ·
n
F (fKs)− [r + δ] · fKso
− [tw − tk] · µ · fKs



1 + [1− tk] · r . (27)
In the following, by applying the envelope theorem, consider how the diﬀerent tax
rates aﬀects the profitability of incorporating in order to maximize private disposable
income for the entrepreneur.
Capital income tax. First, consider an increase in the tax rate on capital income.
The eﬀect on the incentives to incorporate is given by the expression:
∂
³eYl − eYs´
∂tk
=



−2
3
·
n
F (fKl)− [r + δ] ·fKlo
− [1− tw] · r ·
n
F (fKs)− [µ+ r + δ] · fKso
+µ · fKs



[1 + [1− tk] · r]2
(28)
Inspection25 shows that as long as
heYl − Y1i+ [1− tk] · r · h eYs − Y1i > [1− tk] · µ · fKs,
then
∂
³eYl − eYs´
∂tk
< 0.h eYs − Y1i is the maximum value of the net present value of the return to the in-
dividuals labor eﬀort and investments as a self-employed under the split model,
as
heYl − Y1i is as a corporation under corporate tax rules. That is, as long as the
individual is a high income individual and generates so high income through his
entrepreneurial activity as to at least exceed the net benefit from the risk compen-
sation rate under the split model, then the eﬀect of an increased tax rate on capital
income on his incentives to incorporated is negative. The higher the tax rate on cap-
ital income, the smaller the gain from shifting income from labor income to capital
income, and the smaller the tax incentive to incorporate.
25See appendix for discussion.
22
Labor income tax. Now consider an increase in the tax rate on labor income.
The eﬀect of an increased tax rate on the incentives to incorporate is given by:
∂
³eYl − eYs´
∂tw
=
F (fKs)− [µ+ r + δ] · fKs
1 + [1− tk] · r (29)
If the imputed return to the entrepreneur’s labor eﬀort is negative, as it often is
in the start-up phase of a firm, then he would want to stay under the split model
in order to forward this return to deduct against future positive imputed return to
labor. Increased tax rate on labor income would only strengthen this incentive, since
the value of the future deductions is higher.
Only two periods exist in this model. We then know that in order for there to
exist any incentive for the individual to incorporate, then the imputed return to labor
must be positive: F (fKs)−fKs · [µ+ r + δ] > 0. If this condition is met, increased tax
on labor income raises the gap between the marginal tax rates on labor and capital,
and this increases the incentives for the entrepreneur to incorporate in order to
reduce his tax payments,
∂( eYl−fYs)
∂tw > 0. The greater the imputed labor income, the
greater the incentives to incorporate.
The increased tax rate on labor income induces the individual to incorporate.
The result is that more corporations and less self-employed individuals exist in the
economy, even though the activity of these firms is unchanged. The incorporation
is a pure re-labelling of existing production activity, but more individuals engage in
tax avoidance activities.
The risk compensation. The eﬀect of the risk compensation rate, µ, on the
incentives to incorporate is given by:
∂
³eYl − eYs´
∂µ
= − [tw − tk] ·
fKs
1 + [1− tk] · r < 0. (30)
An increased diﬀerence between the split model’s risk compensation and the
entrepreneur’s own valuation of the riskiness of investing in firm real capital and
thus limiting his possibility to investment portfolio diversification actually decreases
the incentives to incorporated. The higher µ is, the higher is the imputed return to
capital, and the more of his total income is taxed as capital income. Hence he does
not need to incorporate in order to shift more of his income from labor income to
capital income.
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7 The tax recognition of real capital depreciation.
Until now it has been assumed that the government knows the exact true real capital
deprecation rate and allows for a tax deduction of this size, α = 1. This is rarely so,
and now consider how the pervious results are aﬀected when α 6= 1.
Eﬀect on the investment level of the self-employed entrepreneur. With
inaccurate tax deduction allowances for real capital depreciation the self-employed
entrepreneur’s investment condition extends to
FKs = r +
[1− α · tw]
1− tw
· δ − tw − tk
1− tw
· µ. (31)
From the above equation we see that if tax deductions for real capital depreci-
ation diﬀer from the actual real capital depreciation, α 6= 1, then a comprehensive
proportional income tax still introduces distortions in the investment market. A re-
strictive tax recognition of real capital depreciation, α < 1, discourages real capital
investments and induces the individual to acquire less real capital than he would
have done in the absence of taxes. A generous tax recognition of depreciation, α > 1,
has the opposite eﬀect.
The eﬀect on the investment behavior of changes in the tax rates is less straight-
forward. A generous tax deduction for depreciation, α > 1, strengthens the over-
and under-investment incentives inherent in the split-model, and the higher the tax
rate on labor income, the larger the tax induced distortions in the investment port-
folio of the individual. A restrictive tax recognition of the depreciation reduces the
distortions.
Eﬀect on the investment level of the incorporated entrepreneur. In the
presence of inaccurate tax allowances for real capital depreciation the incorporated
entrepreneur’s optimal investment condition changes to
FKl = r +
1− α · tk
1− tk
· δ. (32)
The previous neutrality of the corporate taxation brakes down when the real capital
depreciation tax allowances diﬀer from the actual deprecation. If α > 1, the tax
system induces the corporation to over-invest in real capital. On the contrary, if α <
1, the tax system discriminates against real capital investments. These distortions
are stronger the higher the tax rate on capital income is.
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Eﬀect on the choice of organizational form. There exists an asymmetry in
the tax treatment of real capital deprecation under the two tax regimes. Under the
split model, the tax recognized real capital depreciation rate, α · δ, entitles to a tax
allowance against the tax rate on labor income, tw, while it under the corporate tax
regime only entitles to an allowance against the tax rate on capital income, tk, as is
seen from equations (7) and (17). So if the firm had the same amount of real capital
depreciation under the two organizational forms, it would be allowed a higher tax
deduction in the size of (tw − tk) under the split model. For this reason the rate
α of true depreciation recognized for tax deduction still distorts the incentives to
incorporated, even though this factor is the same under both tax regimes:
∂
³eYl − eYs´
∂α
=
−δ ·
h
tw · fKs − 23 · tk ·fKli
1 + [1− tk] · r < 0 (33)
A higher tax recognition of firm real capital reduces total tax payments more un-
der the split model than under the corporate tax model, and hence it reduces the
incentives to incorporate.
8 Summary of results.
i) Less risky real capital objects are used as an income shifting device by the self-
employed entrepreneur in order to have a larger part of his income taxed as capital
income and hence reduce total tax payments. The larger the diﬀerence between the
marginal tax rates on labor and capital income, the higher is the over-investment in
real capital induced by the split model. This eﬀect is initiated by the fact that the
return to all kinds of real capital is imputed at the same rate, independent of the
perceived riskiness of the project by the entrepreneur.
ii) The optimal organizational form will change over the life cycle of a firm. In
the start-up phase, an entrepreneurial firm is likely to have a negative imputed return
to labor. Then it will be optimally for the owner to register as self-employed. When
the firm is more mature and generates a steady stream of income, the individual
would want to shift organizational form to a corporation with passive shareholders.
He then avoids the split model of dual income taxation, and gets larger parts of his
profits taxed at the lower corporate tax rate.
iii) An entrepreneur who incorporates in order to avoid the split model will
keep as many of the shares himself and only invite the minimum required amount
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Figure 1: Value of firm real capital of self-employed entrepreneurs, 1998-prices.
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of passive shareholders to invest in the firm.
iv) The incorporated tax minimizing entrepreneur will pay no wages to himself
and instead pay all profits as dividends.
8.1 Empirical observations support the model predictions.
High-income self-employed entrepreneurs are the ones subject to the top marginal
tax rate on the imputed return to labor, and these are expected to take advantage
of the income shifting possibilities through increased real capital stock. The self-
employed in the top decile of the income distribution more than doubled the value
of their real capital from 1992 to 200026, as figure 1 shows. These are aggregate
data, and it is not possible to see whether there has been a shift in the type or real
capital investments. Unfortunately there are no available data prior to the 1992-tax
reform. Still, it ought to take the firm some time to adjust its investment decision
to the new tax rules. As new self-employed entrepreneurs reach the top marginal
tax bracket on labor income, they would also adapt to the rules. Hence one would
expect a development towards more real capital in this group over time, rather than
a shift to a new investment level directly after the tax reform.
26Calculations made on combined survey and register data from Statistics Norway. Annual sam-
ple of ca. 4000, but weighted for representability. The primary sector is heavily regulated and
subsidized, self-employed in this sector are excluded from the sample.
26
Figure 2: Units of firm real capital per unit of firm business income of self-employed
entrepreneurs.
0,0
1,0
2,0
3,0
4,0
5,0
6,0
7,0
8,0
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
10th income decile Average
1992 marked the end of an economic depression and was followed by a period of
strong economic expansion, this would lead to increased investments independent of
the tax regime. But then the rate of real capital per unit of firm business income
ought to be more or less constant. As seen in figure 2, this is not the case. The high-
income entrepreneurs still increased their share of real capital per unit of business
income more than the average of all self-employed individuals in non-primary sectors.
This indicates that income shifting through over-investment in real capital has taken
place.
The number of self-employed individuals decreased during the 1990ies, while the
total number of corporations increased by more than the same amount, as is seen
in figure27 3. Even if part of the decline of self-employed is due to a reduction of the
primary sector, mostly farming, there was also a reduction of the number of self-
employed in other businesses. At the same time, there was a reduction in the number
of corporations under the split model, and a rapid increase of corporations avoiding
the split model. A strong selection also took place. The corporations that remain
under the split model mostly have negative imputed return to labor, and their active
owners hence do not pay labor income taxes. In 1992, 65% of the corporations under
the split model had negative imputed return to labor, while this share had increased
27Source: Statistics Norway.
Data are unfortunatelly not available for the whole time period in question.
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Figure 3: Number of self-employed individuals and corporations.
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to 80% in 2000. In the year 2000, only 3.5 % of all corporations under the split model
had positive imputed return to labor. In 1995, 28% of all one-man corporations were
taxed according to the split model, and already in 1997 this share had fallen to 20%.
This can be interpreted as an indication of a tax induced shift in organizational
form and choice of tax regime. Self-employed individuals choose to incorporate in
order to escape the split model, and corporations have passive shareholders such as
to escape the split model. Only corporations who have low profits and thus also low
or negative imputed return to labor stay under the split model.
8.2 Conclusions.
The above analysis concludes that the split model of dual income taxation provides
the individual with large incentives for participating in tax minimizing income shift-
ing. It actually induces the self-employed individual to over-invest in less risky firm
real capital. Real capital investment becomes a device to shift income from labor
income to capital income and to enjoy the lower capital income tax rate on a larger
share of total income.
In addition, the corporate organizational form serves as a tax shelter for high
income entrepreneurs. The higher his income, and the larger the diﬀerence between
the tax rates on labor income and capital income, the larger the incentives to incor-
porate (with less than two thirds of the shares held by the active owner) to escape
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the split model and reduce total tax payments. These entrepreneurs would keep close
to the maximum allowed of shares under the split model. Only low-income entrepre-
neurs have incentives to stay under the split model in order to enjoy the forwarding
of negative imputed return to labor, in order to deduct this against future positive
imputed return to labor. Again, it seems like this prediction is supported by actually
observed behavior over the last ten years.
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10 Mathematical appendix.
At which real capital stock should the return to capital be imputed,
at the beginning or at the end of the period? When the split model was
first introduced, the self-employed individual could choose whether the value at the
beginning or at the end of the period should be used in the imputation of the return
to firm capital. Later this changed, and at the present, the average of the values
of firm capital at the beginning and at the end of the period should be used to
impute the return to firm capital, which in our context would be (1 − α·δ
2
) · Ks.
Applying this assessment of firm capital would change the tax equation (7) to Ts =
tk ·ri ·(1− α·δ2 )·Ks+tw ·{F (Ks)−α·δ ·Ks−ri·(1− α·δ2 )·Ks}+tk ·r·B. This would entitle
the individual to a tax deduction for the depreciation of α·δ ·Ks ·(tw− 12 ·ri ·(tw−tk)).
This is smaller than the tax deduction which applies in the present specification of
the model, α · δ ·Ks · tw, but for the benefit of simplicity, this is not considered in
the analysis, and equation (7) is the specification of the tax equation to be used in
this paper. This simplifying assumption does not change the fact that there is an
asymmetrical tax treatment of real capital deprecitation under the two tax regimes,
it only reduces the amplitude of the eﬀect.
The second period income of the self-employed entrepreneur.
Y2,s = F (Ks) + [1− δ] ·Ks + [1 + r] ·Bs − Ts.
⇓
Y n2,s = F (Ks) + [1− δ] ·Ks + [1 + r] ·Bs − tk · [ri ·Ks]− α · δ ·Ks + α · δ ·Ks
−tw · [F (Ks)− α · δ ·Ks − ri ·Ks]− tk · r ·Bs
⇓
Y n2,s = [1− tw] · [F (Ks)− α · δ ·Ks] + {1 + [tw − tk] · ri} ·Ks
− (1− α) · δ ·Ks + [1 + (1− tk) · r] ·Bs
Eq. (8): α = 1 :
Y n2,s = [1− tw] · [F (Ks)− δ ·Ks] + {1 + [tw − tk] · ri} ·Ks + [1 + (1− tk) · r] ·Bs
Utility maximization in the presence of taxes, the self-employed case: Eq. (31):
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maxYs
Ks
∂Ys
∂Ks
=
(
[1− tw] · [FKs − α · δ] + [tw − tk] · ri
−(1− α) · δ − (1− tk) · r
)
1 + (1− tk) · r = 0
⇓
FKs = α · δ +
(1− α) · δ + (1− tk) · r − [tw − tk] · ri
1− tw
⇓ ri = r + µ
FKs = α · δ +
r + (1− α) · δ − tk · r − tw · [r + µ] + tk · [r + µ]
1− tw
⇓
FKs =
·
α+
1− α
1− tw
¸
· δ + [1− tw] · r + [tk − tw] · µ
1− tw
⇓
FKs = r +
1− α · tw
1− tw
· δ − tw − tk
1− tw
· µ
Eq. (10), in the absence of taxes:
FKs = r + δ
Eq. (11), in the presence of taxes: α = 1 :
FKs = r + δ −
tw − tk
1− tw
· µ
Eﬀect on the self-employed entrepreneur’s investements of increased tax
on labor income:
FKs = r +
[1− α · tw] · δ + [tk − tw] · µ
1− tw
⇓
FKts,Ks ·
∂Ks
∂tw
=
[−α · δ − µ] · [1− tw] + [1− α · tw] · δ + [tk − tw] · µ
[1− tw]2
⇓
∂Ks
∂tw
=
[1− α] · δ − [1− tk] · µ
FKs,Ks · [1− tw]2
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Eq. (12) α = 1:
∂Ks
∂tw
= − [1− tk] · µ
FKs,Ks · [1− tw]2
Eq. (13):
FKs,Ks ·
∂Ks
∂tk
=
µ
1− tw
⇓
∂Ks
∂tk
=
µ
FKs,Ks · [1− tw]
< 0
Let fKs be the investment level in firm real capital that maximizes the individual’s
net lifetime income, the right hand side of lifetime budget constraint. The indirect
income function eYs is then given by:
eYs = Y + 1
1 + (1− tk) · r ·



[1− tw] · F (fKs)− [1− tw] · α · δ · fKs
+ [tw − tk] · [r + µ] · fKs
− [(1− α) · δ + (1− tk) · r] · fKs



⇓
eYs = Y + 1
1 + (1− tk) · r ·



[1− tw] · F (fKs)
+
(
−α · δ + tw · α · δ + tw · r + tw · µ
−tk · r − tk · µ− δ + α · δ − r + tk · r
)
· fKs



⇓
eYs = Y + [1− tw] · F (fKs) + {[tw − tk] · µ− [1− tw] · r − [1− tw · α] · δ} · fKs
1 + (1− tk) · r
Eq. (14), α = 1:
eYs = Y + [1− tw] · F (fKs) + {[tw − tk] · µ− [1− tw] · [r + δ]} · fKs
1 + (1− tk) · r
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The entrepreneur’s budget constraint in the presence of taxes, the corporate
case:
C1,l +
C2,l
1 + [1− tk] · r = Y1 − β ·Kl −Bl +



[1− rd] · F (Kl) + β · rd · F (Kl)
+β · [1− δ] ·Kl + [1 + r] ·Bl
− [tw + β · tp] · [1− rd] · F (Kl)
−tk · r ·Bl − tk · β · rd · F (Kl)
+β · tk · α · δ ·Kl



1 + [1− tk] · r
⇓
Yl = Y +



[1− tw − β · tp] · [1− rd] · F (Kl)
+ [1− tk] · β · rd · F (Kl)
−β · ([1− α · tk] · δ + [1− tk] · r) ·Kl



1 + [1− tk] · r
The optimal investment condition, the corporate case:
maxYl
Kl
∂Yl
∂Kl
=



[1− tw − β · tp] · [1− rd] · FKl
+ [1− tk] · β · rd · FKl
−β · ([1− α · tk] · δ + [1− tk] · r)



1 + [1− tk] · r = 0
⇓
FKl = β ·
[1− α · tk] · δ + [1− tk] · r
[1− tw − β · tp] · [1− rd] + [1− tk] · β · rd
Corporation in the absence of taxes. In the absence of taxes, the optimal
investment condition is:
FKl = [δ + r] ·
β
1− [1− β] · rd (34)
In addition to the interest rate and the depreciation rate, the user cost of capital
now depends on how much of the corporation the active owner owns, and how much
of firm income are paid as dividends and wages. If β = 1, the entrepreneur holds
all shares and (34) reduces to the optimal investment condition in the self-employed
case, equation (10). This is not the case if β < 1. But since the income function
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(18) is linear in β, there are no internal optimal values of β, and the only possible
maximum value is at the boundary. Thus β = 1 is the only possible solution, where
the entrepreneur holds all the shares.
As the income function is also linear in the dividend rate, the only possible
optimal values for the dividend rate are at the boundaries, and thus rd = Ω or
rd = 1. Now take a closer look at the lower boundary Ω. The shareholders demand
a return on their invested capital at least as high as the return in to the alternative
investment, bonds. The return to investing their capital in bonds is given by [1− β] ·
Kl · r. The same amount invested in the firm yields the net of capital depreciation
return [1− β] · [rd · F (Kl)− δ ·Kl] . The lower boundary for the dividend payments
is thus given by
[1− β] · rd · F (Kl)− [1− β] · δ ·Kl ≥ [1− β] ·Kl · r
⇓
rd ≥
[r + δ] ·Kl
F (Kl)
⇓
Ω =
[r + δ] ·Kl
F (Kl)
The higher the cost of capital is relative to the value of the firm’s production, the
higher is Ω. That is, the lower boundary on the rate of dividend payments depends
negatively on the firm’s productivity. The more eﬃcient production, the lower share
of the profits need to be paid as dividends to give the shareholders the same return
on their invested capital as in the financial market.
Two possible combinations of ownership share of the entrepreneur and dividend
payment rate exist:
1) : β = 1 and rd = Ω,
2) : β = 1 and rd = 1.
As long as the entrepreneur is the sole owner and the only person working in the
firm, in the absence of taxes it does not matter whether he pays the firm profits as
wages to himself or as dividends. Both rd = 1 and rd = Ω maximize his income,
and alternative 1) and 2) both represent optimal solutions. Applying these values in
the analysis and inserting them into the optimal investment condition (34), we see
that the dividend payments do not matter for the optimal investment level. Both
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alternative 1) and 2) reduce the optimal investment condition to equation (19):
FKl = r + δ,
which is identical to the Fisher condition (10) developed in the self-employed case.
Also, by applying the optimal values of alternative 1) and 2), the individual’s budget
restriction reduces to that of the self-employed entrepreneur in the absence of taxes.
The individual’s investment portfolio and income level are in the absence of taxes
both unaﬀected by the choice of organizational form.
Eq. (21): By investing his capital in bonds, the passive shareholder would receive
the net return
[1− tk] · r · [1− β] ·Kl.
Shares in the corporation yield the net return
[1− β] · {[1− tk] · rd · F (Kl)− [1− tk] · [1− α] · δ ·Kl − tp · [1− rd] · F (Kl)} ,
the passive shareholders net of capital income tax dividend receipt, his share of the
non-tax deductible real capital depreciation, and his share of the pay-roll tax due
on the firm’s hand. For the external investor to be willing to invest in the firm, the
net return on investments in firm real capital must be at least as high as the net
return to investments in the financial market. Hence
[1− β] ·



[1− tk] · rd · F (Kl)
− [1− tk] · [1− α] · δ ·Kl
−tp · [1− rd] · F (Kl)



≥ [1− tk] · r · [1− β] ·Kl
⇓ · 1
F (Kl) · [1− β]
[1− tk + tp] · rd − [1− tk] · [1− α] · δ · Kl
F (Kl)
− tp ≥ [1− tk] · r · Kl
F (Kl)
⇓ · 1
1− tk + tp
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rd ≥
[1− tk] · r + [1− tk] · [1− α] · δ
1− tk + tp
· Kl
F (Kl)
+
tp
1− tk + tp
⇓
Ωt =
[1− tk] · r + [1− tk] · [1− α] · δ
1− tk + tp
· Kl
F (Kl)
+
tp
1− tk + tp
⇓ α = 1
Ωt =
[1− tk] · r · KlF (Kl) + tp
1− tk + tp
Eq. (23):
Il > 0
⇓
2
3
· [1− tk] · [1 + tp]
1− tw
− 1 > 0
⇓
2
3
· [1− tk] · [1 + tp] > 1− tw
⇓
tw >
1
3
+
2
3
· [tk − (1− tk) · tp]
The optimal investment condition (32):
β =
2
3
, rd = 1
⇓
FKl =
2
3
· [1− α · tk] · δ + [1− tk] · r
[1− tk] · 23
⇓
FKl = r +
1− α · tk
1− tk
· δ
Eq. (24), α = 1:
FKl = r + δ
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The diﬀerence between the maximum achievable lifetime income under the
two organizational forms:
eYl − eYs = Y +
(
2
3
· [1− tk] · F (fKl)
−2
3
· ([1− α · tk] · δ + [1− tk] · r) ·fKl
)
1 + [1− tk] · r
−Y −
(
[1− tw] · F (fKs) +( [tw − tk] · µ− [1− tw] · r − [1− tw · α] · δ
)
· fKs)
1 + (1− tk) · r
⇓
eYl − eYs =



2
3
· [1− tk] · F (fKl)− [1− tw] · F (fKs)
−2
3
· ([1− α · tk] · δ + [1− tk] · r) ·fKl
− {[tw − tk] · µ− [1− tw] · r − [1− tw · α] · δ} · fKs



1 + [1− tk] · r
Eq. (27), α = 1:
eYl − eYs =



2
3
· [1− tk] ·
n
F (fKl)− [r + δ] ·fKlo
− [1− tw] ·
n
F (fKs)− [r + δ] · fKso
− [tw − tk] · µ · fKs



1 + [1− tk] · r
Eﬀects on the organizational choice of increased tax on capital income:
∂
³fY nl − fY ns ´
∂tk
=
Z
[1 + [1− tk] · r]2
, where
Z =
½
−2
3
· F (fKl)− 2
3
· [−α · δ − r] ·fKl + µ · fKs¾ · {1 + [1− tk] · r}
+r ·



2
3
· [1− tk] · F (fKl)− [1− tw] · F (fKs)
−2
3
· ([1− α · tk] · δ + [1− tk] · r) ·fKl
− {[tw − tk] · µ− [1− tw] · r − [1− tw · α] · δ} · fKs



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Z =
2
3
· {−1− r + r · tk} · F (fKl)
+
2
3
· ©α · δ + α · δ · r − α · δ · r · tk + r + r2 + r2 · tkª ·fKl
+ {µ+ µ · r − tk · µ · r} · fKs + 2
3
· [r − tk · r] · F (fKl)− [r − tw · r] · F (fKs)
−2
3
· ¡r · δ − α · tk · r · δ + r2 − tk · r2¢ ·fKl
−
©
tw · µ · r − tk · µ · r − r2 + tw · r2 − r · δ + tw · α · r · δ
ª · fKs
Z =
2
3
· {−1− r + r · tk + r − tk · r} · F (fKl)− [r − tw · r] · F (fKs)
+
2
3
·
(
α · δ + α · δ · r − α · δ · r · tk + r + r2
+r2 · tk − r · δ + α · tk · r · δ − r2 + tk · r2
)
·fKl
+
(
µ+ µ · r − tk · µ · r − tw · µ · r + tk · µ · r
+r2 − tw · r2 + r · δ − tw · α · r · δ
)
· fKs
Z = −2
3
· F (fKl)− [1− tw] · r · F (fKs)
+
2
3
· {(1 + r) · α · δ + (1− δ) · r} ·fKl
+
½·
1
r
+ (1− tw)
¸
· µ+ [1− tw] · r + [1− tw · α] · δ
¾
· r · fKs
Z = −2
3
·
h
F (fKl)− r ·fKli+ 2
3
· {(1 + r) · α · δ − δ · r} ·fKl
−r ·
n
[1− tw] · F (fKs)− {[1− tw] · r + [1− tw · α] · δ} · fKso
+ {1 + [1− tw] · r} · µ · fKs
From the equations (14) and (25) the maximum value of the present value of total
net individual income under the two organizational forms are given by
fY ns = Y1 + [1− tw] · F (fKs) + {[tw − tk] · µ− [1− tw] · r − [1− tw · α] · δ} · fKs1 + (1− tk) · r
⇓
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[1− tw] · F (fKs)− {[1− tw] · r + [1− tw · α] · δ} · fKs
=
hfY ns − Y1i · [1 + (1− tk) · r]− [tw − tk] · µ · fKs
and
fY nl = Y1 + 23 · [1− tk] · F (fKl)− 23 · ([1− α · tk] · δ + [1− tk] · r) ·fKl1 + [1− tk] · r
⇓
2
3
·
h
F (fKl)− r ·fKli = hfY nl − Y1i · 1 + (1− tk) · r1− tk + 23 ·
·
1− α · tk
1− tk
¸
· δ ·fKl
Applying this in the expression for Z yields :
Z = −
hfY nl − Y1i · 1 + (1− tk) · r1− tk − 23 ·
·
1− α · tk
1− tk
¸
· δ ·fKl
+
2
3
· {(1 + r) · α · δ − δ · r} ·fKl
−r ·
nhfY ns − Y1i · [1 + (1− tk) · r]− [tw − tk] · µ · fKso
+ {1 + [1− tw] · r} · µ · fKs
Z = −
hfY nl − Y1i · 1 + (1− tk) · r1− tk
+
2
3
·
·
−1− α · tk
1− tk
+ α+ (α− 1) · r
¸
· δ ·fKl
−r ·
hfY ns − Y1i · [1 + (1− tk) · r]
+ {1 + [1− tw + tw − tk] · r} · µ · fKs
Z = −
hfY nl − Y1i · 1 + (1− tk) · r1− tk
+
2
3
·
·
−1 + α · tk + α− α · tk + (α− 1) · r · (1− tk)
1− tk
¸
· δ ·fKl
−r ·
hfY ns − Y1 − µr · fKsi · [1 + (1− tk) · r]
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Z =
2
3
·
·
1
1− tk
+ r
¸
· [α− 1] · δ ·fKl
+
·
µ · fKs − r · hfY ns − Y1i− hfY nl − Y1i · 11− tk
¸
· [1 + (1− tk) · r]
Z < 0⇒
∂
³fY nl − fY ns ´
∂tk
> 0
Z < 0 if
2
3
·
h
1
1−tk + r
i
· [α− 1] · δ
1 + (1− tk) · r ·
fKl + µ · fKs
< r ·
hfY ns − Y1i+ hfY nl − Y1i · 11− tk
2
3
· [1 + (1− tk) · r] · [α− 1] · δ
1 + (1− tk) · r ·
fKl + (1− tk) · µ · fKs
< (1− tk) · r ·
hfY ns − Y1i+ hfY nl − Y1i
2
3
· [α− 1] · δ ·fKl + (1− tk) · µ · fKs
< (1− tk) · r ·
hfY ns − Y1i+ hfY nl − Y1i
(1− tk) · r ·
hfY ns − Y1i+ hfY nl − Y1i− 23 · [α− 1] · δ ·fKl − (1− tk) · µ · fKs > 0½hfY nl − Y1i− 23 · [α− 1] · δ ·fKl
¾
+ (1− tk) ·
n
r ·
hfY ns − Y1i− µ · fKso > 0
where
h eYs − Y1i is the maximum value of the net present value of the return to the
individuals labor eﬀort and investments as a self-employed under the split model,
as
heYl − Y1i is as a corporation under corporate tax rules.
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